Key indications for respective chapters:
- Max. 1000 words
- Not an academic paper, so keep the style ‘journalistic’
- For references please note that they will appear as endnotes in the final version. Please use APA 7th edition, ex: Schmidt, B. (2020). Richtig zitieren: Eine Anleitung für Studierende (2. Aufl.). Springer.
Structure:
- Context + policy issue (you can use the 'issue' descriptions as basis - see below)
- Final vision for 2040 (incl. main elements)
- Description of policy steps taken (in chronological order)
- 3-5 main policy recommendations (+ who should act) in bullets
Examples from former foraus policy briefs:
- Objective 2050: Four visions for a comprehensive NCD prevention strategy (policy brief from Global Lab edition on NCD prevention)
- Switzerland at the UN Security Council (short brief mainly summarizing workshop outcomes)
- Introducing the Purple Age: Crowdsourced recommendations for a Feminist Foreign Policy (international participatory process on FFP, check out the listing of recommendations on pp. 4-7)
- Quo vadis? Envisioning human mobility for 2050 (output from another Policy Kitchen participatory process - with various formats)
- Der bilaterale Weg: Wie weiter mit einem überholten Betriebssystem? Updates in 5 Bereichen zugunsten der Schweizer Bevölkerung (publication with multiple articles written by different authors)
Details about issue clusters dealt with during our workshop on Friday (24.03):
Equity I: Unequal distribution of pandemic-related products (incl. vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)
- Absence of a functional global supply chain and logistics network (incl. in inter-pandemic times).
- No agreement on type and size of products needed for robust pandemic PPR, costs, logistics for strategic stockpiles, no regular epidemiologic risk-assessment.
- Limited regional and multilateral purchasing mechanisms, limited transparency in cost and pricing of elements along supply chain (e.g. raw materials and other inputs needed for sustainable production of pandemic-related products such as active pharmaceutical ingredients).
- Unequal global distribution of manufacturing capacity of pandemic-related products, notably with regard to LMICs.
- Unequal distribution of research and development capacities of pandemic-related products, limited knowledge-sharing mechanisms and limited transparency on R&D spending
Equity II: Unequal access to pandemic-related products as well as pathogens with pandemic potential and genomic sequences
- Absence of mechanism for fair and equitable allocation of pandemic-related products based on public health needs.
- Absence of global mechanism promoting and incentivizing transfer of technology and know-how for production of pandemic-related products (notably maintained in inter-pandemic times).
- No agreement on globally applicable time-bound waivers of IP rights enabling acceleration and scaling up of production of pandemic-related products.
- Limited access to pathogens with pandemic potential.
- Limited sharing mechanisms of benefits related to access to such pathogens (e.g. production of vaccines and other pandemic-related products).
- Absence of global Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing System (so-called “PABS System”)
HS capacity I: Health systems lacking capacity to respond to pandemic-related public health crises
- Limited health emergency prevention and preparedness systems in place and limited financial, technical and technological support, assistance and cooperation notably to LMICs in this area.
- Lack of capacity which could ensure resilient health systems (notably with regard to available human resources, health system recovery strategies, standard protocols for infection prevention and control).
- Lack of sustainable health and care workforce capacity within national public health systems.
HS capacity II: Health systems lacking surveillance capacity to respond to pandemic-related public health crises
- Limited collaborative genomics networks for surveillance and global sharing of emerging pathogens.
- Lack of capacity which could ensure resilient health systems (notably with regard to surveillance capacity, laboratory capacity for genomic sequencing, health laboratory and diagnostic capacities, platforms for information sharing and forecasting).
Prevention I: Drivers of the (re-)emergence of disease at human-animal interface are insufficiently being addressed
- Climate change and desertification are not sufficiently included in pandemic PPR while they are part of root causes of pandemic outbreaks.
- Lacking surveillance systems and laboratory capacity with One Health approach.
Prevention II: Drivers of the (re-)emergence of disease at human-animal interface are insufficiently being addressed
- Industrial agri-food systems, land use change, wildlife trade and AMR are not sufficiently included into pandemic PPR while they are part of root causes of pandemic outbreaks.
- Lacking surveillance systems and laboratory capacity with One Health approach.